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REVIEW ARTICLE

How to Be Persuasive in Literary Theory:
The Case of Wolfgang lser

Wolfgang lser's latest book, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic
Response (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978), is a persuasive
book indeed. I have little doubt that it will be welcomed by American literary
critics who are attempting to incorporate "the reader" into a critical tradition
long preoccupied with the autonomous text. For most Iiterary theorists, the
question is no longer whether the reader's interaction with the text should be
discussed but how. lser's new book, a translation of his 1976 Der Akt des
Lesens, will find a comfortable place within these contemporary debates over
readers reading. But why should this reader-centered "book of Germanic
phenomenology" be so easily adaptable to the American critical tradition, a
tradition long dominated by the objectivist theorizing of New Critical for·
malism? In other words, why is The Act of Reading a persuasive book?
Of course, my opening remarks already suggest one answer to this question: The Act of Reading appears in the United States at a time when many
American theorists are aggressively promoting the reader's role in creating the
literary work and still others are emphasizing the effects of the text on its real
and ideal audiences. Reader-oriented critics like Louise Rosenblatt, Stanley
Fish, Stephen Booth, Norman Holland, and David Bleich place the interaction
of reader and text at the center of their otherwise very different literary
theories. Jonathan Culler's Structuralist Poetics, a most useful introduction to
structuralism, transforms this continental import into an account of readers'
"literary competence," which consists of reading conventions for naturalizing
literary texts. Even American versions of deconstruction include some mention
of readers; in describing his Nietzschean premises, J. Hillis Miller writes: "The
reading of a work involves an active intervention on the part of the reader.
Each reader takes possession of the work for one reason or another and
imposes on it a certain pattern of meaning." This recent concern for readers
within American criticism is paralleled by the return of rhetoric to literature
departments. Whether that rhetoric is composition theory or the "New
Rhetoric" of Perelman, Burke, Weaver, and Richards, the discipline of literary

[Centrum New Series, 1:1 (Spring 1981 ), pp. 65-73.]

66

Review Article

studies discovers in its return a revitalized interest in the effect (persuasive and
otherwise) that texts have upon their reading audiences. Influencing, and
influenced by, this resurrection of rhetoric, reader-oriented theory attempts to
find new ways for describing how literature affects its readers during and after
the reading process.
lser's new book, a theoretical companion to his The Implied Reader (1974),
offers contemporary American criticism a detailed model of aesthetic response
by describing the reading process and the effects of that process. This account
of reading begins with a functionalist model of the literary text, which focuses
on two interrelated areas, the intersection between text and social reality and
the interaction between text and reader. lser does not take a strictly mimetic
position in discussing the relation between the literary text and reality: for
him, literature does more than simply reflect or represent society; it responds
to its deficiencies. "In general, literary texts constitute a reaction to contemporary situations, bringing attention to problems that are conditioned though
not resolved by contemporary norms." One of literature's basic functions is
"to reveal and perhaps even balance the deficiencies resulting from prevailing
[thought] systems." For example, the eighteenth-century novel and drama
were preoccupied with questions of morality; this preoccupation "balanced
out the deficiencies of the dominant thought system of the time," Lockean
empiricism, which called into question the traditional assumptions guiding
human conduct without providing new ethical premises to replace them. In
effect, "literature supplies those possibilities which have been excluded by the
prevalent system." Literature accomplishes this, however, not by formulating
these possibilities in the text but by causing the reader to formulate them for
himself.
Here we move from the intersection of text and reality to the interaction
of reader and text. Literature entangles the reader "in the situation to which
the text is a reaction." The author extracts social and historical norms (and
references to past literature) from their original contexts and places them
together to form the "repertoire of the text." In a novel, these "depragmatized" norms are distributed among various textual "perspectives" - the
narrator, the characters, the plot, and the fictitious reader - and the system
of perspectives they form outlines the author's view without stating it and
provides the potential structure for the reader to actualize. The connections
among the various perspectives emerge during the reading process, "in the
course of which the reader's role is to occupy shifting vantage points that are
geared to a prestructured activity and to fit the diverse perspectives into a
gradually evolving pattern" that forms the "configurative meaning" of the
text. This convergence of the textual perspectives functions as the standpoint
from which the reader formulates the text's reaction to its social and historical environment. This reaction is not explicit in the text itself; rather, during
the reading process the text becomes a "set of instructions" for the reader's
production of the text's reaction, the author's view, the meaning of the literary work. Thus, by presenting familiar norms in unfamiliar arrangements, the
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literary text points up the deficiencies of those norms and manipulates the
reader into formulating a reaction to these deficiencies. lser gives Fielding's
Tom Jones as an example of a detail of this process: Fielding presents
Allworthy as a representative of perfect Christian benevolence, but then he
juxtaposes the Allworthy perspective to Blifil, whom the reader comes to see
as the embodiment of hypocritical piety. But why does Allworthy trust Blifil?
The reader soon draws the conclusion that Allworthy is naive and impractical
in that his "perfection is simply incapable of conceiving a mere pretence of
ideality." Fielding has forced the reader to this conclusion though he has not
stated it in the text itself. The reader combines the various perspectives Allworthy, Blifil, and the plot- into a "consistent gestalt" which resolves the
tensions that resulted from the juxtaposition of the perspectives. But, again,
"this gestalt is not explicit in the text-it emerges from a projection of the
reader, which is guided in so far as it arises out of the identification of the
connections between the signs."
lser's model of the reading process is much more complex than what I have
presented so far. I will return later to at least one more aspect of it. But for
now I will restrict myself to the short· and long-term effects of reading that
lser describes. For lser, reading is not a one-way process in which the passive
reader merely internalizes the structures in the text; rather, it is a "dynamic
interaction" in which the active reader is constantly responding to the meanings he produces in this interaction. Consistency-building and image-making
are continual reading activities guided by the text; the configurative meaning
must be assembled by the reader, who is then, in turn, affected by what he
has assembled. The result of this literary effect involves a restructuring of the
reader's experience, a phenomenon which occurs most forcibly in the reading
of those texts that incorporate the norms that the reader already holds. Here
the deficiencies that the text forces the reader to locate and resolve are
deficiencies in the reader's own structuring of experience. A reader open to
the text and its effects will have to reformulate his system of norms in order
to accommodate the meaning the text has led him to assemble. Thus, the act
of reading literature provides "an experience which entails the reader constituting himself by constituting a reality hitherto unfamiliar to himself." It is in
this way that literature significantly changes its readers.
Like others before him, lser makes a distinction between meaning and
significance. "Meaning is the referential totality which is implied by the aspects contained in the text and which must be assembled in the course of
reading. Significance is the reader's absorption of the meaning into his own
existence." lser's account provides for differing concretizations (meanings) of
the same text and for different applications (significances) of the meanings
assembled. But his phenomenology of reading is concerned primarily with
describing the general structure of concretization and not the specific, historical actualizations of that structure. Thus, he distinguishes his theory of aesthetic response from the theory of reception (which is an account dealing with
"existing readers, whose reactions testify to certain historically conditioned
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experiences of literature"). Similarly, lser is more interested in the structure
of potential applications rather than the actual ways literary meanings have
been applied in the experiences of historical readers or groups of readers.
Because of these emphases in The Act of Reading, there are, by design, few
examples of conflicting interpretations of the same text and few specific
examples of significant changes produced in actual readers by literature. I find
this exclusion disappointing because by constantly refusing to discuss conflict·
ing responses and actual examples of change, lser talks about potential, pre·
structured effects on readers in a way that at times closely resembles very
traditional discussions of texts in isolation. As we will see in a moment, this
disguised talk of texts becomes another aspect of Iser's persuasiveness within
American critical discourse.
Nevertheless, lser's account of the reading process and literary effects does
offer much of real value to contemporary critical theory and its emerging
concern with the reader's response to literature. This is one reason The Act of
Reading will be welcomed by American critics and theorists. However, I will
make a stronger claim: among the theoretical models of reading now being
promoted in this country, lser's has the best chance of persuading the most
people to adopt its shape and contents. The reason I make such a prediction
has less to do with the present interest in readers and more to do with the
critical tradition in which this interest is currently manifested. Put simply,
lser's book will persuade not only because of what it says about readers but
perhaps even more decisively because of what it does (and doesn't) say about
texts.
The Act of Reading and the American critical tradition share some basic
assumptions about literary texts, and these common assumptions constitute
the main source of lser's persuasive power within American critical discourse.
However, these shared premises are often covered over by lser's rhetoric of
reading and his critique of certain influential forces in recent American
theory. For example, lser's direct attack on Anglo-American New Criticism is
especially revealing for what it suggests about his hidden agreements with
aspects of the hegemonic position he is attacking.

lser places his critique of New Criticism in the context of a more general
attack on the "classical norm of interpretation," which he characterizes as an
outdated mode of referential analysis searching for an extractable meaning in
the text (instead of a meaning experienced by the reader). This extractable
meaning is at the service of a mimetic truth and manifests itself in the text as
a harmonized totality of balance, order, and completeness. lser writes that
New Criticism marked "a turning-point in literary interpretation" to the
extent that it rejected "the vital elements of the classical norm, namely, that
the work is an object containing the hidden meaning of a prevailing truth." In
place of the search for the hidden message and representational meaning, New
Criticism was concerned with "the elements of the work and their interaction," with the functions operating within the text. But lser points out that
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despite this important rev1s1on in the critical tradition, New Criticism still
preserved the classical norm of harmony, which took on "a value of its own,
whereas in the past it was subservient to the appearance of truth." This
harmonizing of textual elements with its discovery and eventual removal of
ambiguities was "the unacknowledged debt of New Criticism to the classical
norm of interpretation," and it was here that New Criticism set and reached
its limits. New Critics attempted to define the functions of the literary text
through the same interpretive norm - harmony - used to uncover represen·
tational meaning. But "a function is not a meaning - it brings about an
effect, and this effect cannot be measured by the same criteria as are used in
evaluating the appearance of truth." lser's functionalist model of the text and
his phenomenology of reading attempt to move beyond New Critical limitations. However, his theory's relationship to New Criticism is similar to the
complicitous relation he describes between New Criticism and the classical
norm of interpretation: New Critics rejected the classical norm while preserving its value of harmony; lser rejects New Criticism while preserving its
assumption of a prior and independent text. As I will show, lser's continued
valorization of the text affects his theory just as crucially as the preservation
of harmony limited the New Criticism.
It is not simply the general valorization of the text that signals a disguised
continuity between lser's functionalist theory and the critical tradition that
New Criticism represents. A more surprising Iink is the role played by Polish
philosopher Roman I ngarden and his phenomenology of the literary work.
Rene Wellek and Austin Warren's 1949 study, Theory of Literature, crystallized the American movement toward intrinsic criticism, a movement dominated by New Criticism. Wellek made acknowledged use of I ngarden in his
central chapter, "The Mode of Existence of a Literary Work of Art," in which
he defined a poem as a "system of norms" consisting of "several strata, each
implying its own subordinate group"; lngarden outlined these strata in section
eight of The Literary Work of Art. lngarden's stratified view of the literary
work formed the foundation of Wellek and Warren's theory of intrinsic criticism, and the Theory of Literature, in turn, became one of the most influential theoretical statements for the dominant force in American criticism.
lser's theory of reading has a two-fold relation to lngarden's phenomenology and to Wellek and Warren's Theory of Literature. lser borrows many
of lngarden's concepts - concretization, schematized aspects, sentence correlates, places of indeterminacy, the depragmatized character of fictional language. But lser's initial use of lngarden differs from Wellek's: lser emphasizes
the model of reading given fullest treatment in lngarden's The Cognition of
the Literary Work of Art, while Wellek used only the model of the work
presented in lngarden's much earlier book, The Literary Work of Art. Furthermore, lser criticizes lngarden's account and considerably revises it. For example, he praises lngarden for proposing the idea of concretization but critiques
its development in lngarden's theory, where "concretization was just the
actualization of the potential elements of the work - it was not an inter-
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action between text and reader; this is why [lngarden's] 'places of indeterminacy' lead only to an undynamic completion, as opposed to a dynamic
process" in which the reader is made to switch textual perspectives and establish connections between them.
But a second criticism of lngarden by lser signals a more subtle relation to
lngarden's theory (and ultimately a closer connection to the critical tradition
Wellek and Warren represent). lser lists as one of the major drawbacks of
lngarden's account the fact that Ingarden "is unable to accept the possibility
that a work may be concretized in different, equally valid, ways." Wellek's use
of lngarden was motivated by the very characteristic that lser seems to be
rejecting here. Wellek wrote that "we can distinguish between right and wrong
readings of a poem, or between a recognition or a distortion of the norms
implicit in a work of art, by acts of comparison, by a study of different false
or incomplete realizations .... A hierarchy of viewpoints, a criticism of the
grasp of norms, is implied in the concept of the adequacy of interpretation."
Adequacy, or validity, in interpretation represents an overriding concern for
the American critical tradition. This concern has grown in recent years because of the challenge from reader-response and post-structuralist theories. In
a 1978 essay in Critical Inquiry, Wellek responded to these new onslaughts
against interpretive adequacy. characterizing them as "the new anarchy which
allows a complete liberty of interpretation." In a recent issue of The Sewanee
Review, Cleanth Brooks, another respected advocate of intrinsic criticism, has
communicated more colorfully the continuing fear of "what can happen when
there is a lack of theoretical restraints": "Literary interpretation becomes a
game of tennis played without a net and on a court with no back Iines."
The question becomes, then, does lser's critique of lngarden indicate a
rejection of validity in interpretation, a central tenet of the American critical
tradition? This does not seem to be the case. lser rejects only the notion that
each text offers just one valid concretization, one correct meaning. For lser,
there is a prestructured range of meanings that the reader can validly assemble
from the same text: "the structure of the text allows for different ways of
fulfillment." lser's stand is simply (and conveniently) another version of the
critical pluralism quite respectable within traditional American literary theory
(as most recently demonstrated by Wayne Booth's Critical Understanding).
But what is not acceptable in this tradition is a critical pluralism without
limits; note Booth's subtitle, "The Powers and Limits of Pluralism," and the

extended discussion in Critical Inquiry among Booth, M. H. Abrams, J. Hillis
Miller, and others over "The Limits of Pluralism." In American theory, validity in interpretation has been guaranteed most often by constraints in the
literary text that limit the range of permissible meanings to be derived from
that text. lser's account of reading supplies just the kind of textual constraints
that make most critics comfortable. These constraints are the manipulative
devices for ensuring that the reader can be properly guided: "Although the
reader must participate in the assembly of meaning by realizing the structure
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inherent in the text, it must not be forgotten that he stands outside the text.
His position must therefore be manipulated by the text if his viewpoint is to
be properly guided."
For lser. the text's arrangement of perspectives guides the reader as he
attempts to project a consistent pattern resolving the tensions among the
various norms distributed among those perspectives. "The interaction fails
if ... the reader's projections superimpose themselves unimpeded upon the
text." How exactly does the arrangement of perspectives guide the reader's
activities and impede his projections? Between and within the textual perspec·
tives, there are blanks (previously called gaps in The Implied Reader). These
blanks are vacancies in the overall system of the text. "They indicate that the
different segments of the text are to be connected, even though the text itself
does not say so. They are the unseen joints of the text, and as they mark off
schemata and textual perspectives from one another. they simultaneously
trigger acts of ideation [image-building) on the reader's part." The blanks
"function virtually as instructions" in the "theme-and-horizon structure" of
the reading process. As the reader moves through the text, he constantly shihs
from one perspective to another. The perspective he assumes at any one
moment becomes the "theme" which is read against the "horizon" of the
previous perspectives in which he had been situated; in the Tom Jones example given above, the Allworthy perspective is first a theme, then part of the
horizon for judging the Blifil perspective, and then a theme again but this
time one that is interpreted against the changed horizon that now contains the
perspective of Blifil. The reader fills the blanks between perspectives according
to the theme-and-horizon structure, which guides him to negate or to modify
each thematic perspective in light of the accumulated horizon of previous
perspectives. The perspectives, blanks, and theme-and-horizon structure constitute the constraints that lser's account places on the reader's interpretation of
the whole text.
This description provides an adequate composite of the textual constraints
lser presents. In passing, I would like to comment briefly on the status of
these constraints in order to clarify the foundations of all such textual
theories. The underlying basis of the interpretive constraints lser proposes is
the negating relationship among the perspectives. Negation characterizes the
connections that the reader projects to fill the blanks between segments, and
it describes the horizon's relation to the theme during any moment in the
time-flow of reading. The reader's "process of formulation is continually
guided by negation." In each case, what is negated (challenged, modified, etc.)
is one perspective by another. And for lser a perspective's specific negating
function in any particular text is an uninterpreted given in that text, constraining the reader's assembly of meaning. For example, lser lists four basic
types of perspective arrangements for narrative texts - counterbalance, opposition, echelon, and serial. It is not necessary to describe how each of these
arrangements functions. What is important here is that these relations between
perspectives, as they appear in any particular narrative text, are not intersub-
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jective givens as lser supposes. Rather they are constructs varying according to
an on-going interpretation. This means they cannot serve as prior textual
constraints on that interpretive work because they are already its products.
Whether the hero's perspective counterbalances a minor character's or vice
versa is always an interpretation and never a given in the text as lser holds. Of
course, I could go even further and say that not only is the relation between
the hero and a min or character an interpretive construct, but so is the "fact"
that a certain character is designated "the hero" and another only "a minor
character." The same holds for even the apparently more basic "given," the
individual character in a text. And so on. It's interpretation all the way down.
However, the textual theorist must start somewhere. Once such a theorist has
the category of a "prior and independent text," he must begin filling it with
textual elements, givens that will constrain its interpretation. These "givens"
form the enabling fiction of any theory of the text. lser's enabling fiction is
the negative relation between textual perspectives. With this "given" he supports his functionalist model of the text and his whole phenomenology of
reading. But the problematic nature of lser's constraints in no way undermines
the persuasiveness of his reading model within the American critical tradition
because all the textual theories in that tradition also build their models of
independent texts upon the fiction of uninterpreted givens.
It might at first seem a bit odd to say that lser promotes the notion of an
independent text, even in the problematic way I have described. After all, his
is a phenomenological theory of reading, and he continually emphasizes how
the subject-object division is destroyed during the reading process. But these
claims must be examined closely. For in lser's account, it is the literary work
and not the text that is dependent on the reader for its existence: "the
literary work has two poles, which we might call the artistic and the aesthetic:
the artistic pole is the author's text and the aesthetic is the realization accomplished by the reader. In view of this polarity, it is clear that the work itself
cannot be identical with the text or with the concretization, but must be
situated somewhere between the two." The text remains independent and
prior to the reader's activities as it initiates, guides, and corrects the reader's
concretization of the literary work. I would argue, then, that despite his
critiques of New Criticism and lngarden, lser ultimately demonstrates that he
shares with Wellek, Brooks, and Booth a belief in interpretive validity guaranteed by constraints in a prior and independent text; and these shared assumptions make lser's detailed account of reading extremely attractive to traditional literary theorists in America.

Unfortunately, by presenting a reading model that is easily adapted to the
American critical tradition, lser is in danger of undercutting one of the purposes for writing his book: in his preface he suggests that the "anthropological
side of literary criticism" deserves more attention, and he hopes that some
hints in The Act of Reading might encourage a concern for the "actual function of literature in the overall make-up of man." Within today's sterile and
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restnct1ve critical discourse, these are daring, even courageous goals, and
indeed many of lser's discussions do direct our attention to how literature
functions in this humanistic way. His account of literary effect, of how litera·
ture changes its readers, certainly moves in this direction. But this fine
attempt might be erased because of the text-centered theory of reading that is
its foundation. The emphasis on textual constraints and the prestructuring of
effect, combined with the lack of examples of differing interpretations and
significant changes in readers, all of this will make it quite easy for lser's
theory to be grafted onto the American critical tradition without really affecting the text-centered, a-rhetorical criticism and theory that tradition fosters.
Thus, while it actually contains the seeds of a radically social and rhetorical
approach, The Act of Reading is persuasive because it appears to be safe: it
gives the American critic just enough of the reader but not too much. Or,
more exactly, it provides an acceptable model of the text partially disguised as
an innovative account of reading. Very economically, then, it fulfills both
needs of current American theory: it incorporates the reader into a theory of
literature while it maintains the traditional American valorization of the
autonomous text. lser allows American theorists to have their text and reader
too.
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